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INTRODUCTION
International organizations, particularly international financial
institutions, are becoming central players in promoting compliance with
human rights norms and the adoption of social and environmental
standards. The policymaking of the World Bank exemplifies this trend. By
adopting operational policies on issues like indigenous peoples, involuntary
resettlement, and environmental assessment, the World Bank has emerged as
an important actor in the interpretive community for public international law.1
World Bank operational policies are becoming de facto global standards
among other development banks as well as institutions engaged in project
finance. For example, they serve as a model for the Equator Principles, a set
of voluntary social and environmental guidelines that have been adopted by
at least twenty-nine private banks.2 Export credit agencies (ECAs) are
another type of economic actor applying Bank policies on environmental
and social issues, largely in response to outside pressure.3 In 2000, a group
of more than 300 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) signed the
Jakarta Declaration for Reform of Official Export Credit and Investment
Insurance Agencies, which includes a call for "[b]inding common
environmental and social guidelines and standards [that are] no lower and
less rigorous than existing international procedures and standards for public
international finance such as those of the World Bank Group." 4 Although
1. Interpretive communities are groups that "establish their own meanings .. through their
constant struggle to define and maintain the independence and authority of their nomos," or
normative universe of rules and principles of justice. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (1983). They possess a degree
of norm-generating autonomy, which allows them to "interpret the terms of the[ir] association's
own being." Id. at 32.
2. The Equator Principles are modeled on the social and environmental standards of the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private-sector arm of the World Bank. They were
originally conceived in October 2002 when the IFC invited a group of major private banks to
discuss an environmental and social risk-assessment framework for the projects that they finance
that are over fifty million dollars in size. These projects often include oil and gas pipelines and
hydroelectric dams, which are particularly prone to causing environmental and social disruption.
The Equator Principles' preamble states, "We will not provide loans directly to projects where the
borrower will not or is unable to comply with our environmental and social policies and
processes." THE "EQUATOR PRINCIPLES": AN INDUSTRY APPROACH FOR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN DETERMINING, ASSESSING AND MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIAL RISK
IN PROJECT FINANCING, at pmbl. (2003), available at http://www.equator-principles.com/
documents/EquatorPrinciples.pdf; see also Tom Nelthorpe, Principled Finance?, PROJECT FIN.,
June 2003, at 20, 20.
3. ECAs are public agencies, like the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the U.S.
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, that provide government-backed financing to
corporations from their home countries to conduct business abroad, particularly in developing
countries.
4. ECA Watch, Jakarta Declaration for Reform of Official Export Credit and Investment
Insurance Agencies, http://www.eca-watch.org/goals/jakartadec.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2005).
Since the signing of the Jakarta Declaration, member governments of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Working Party on Export Credits and Credit
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the Bank has faced protests over controversial projects, 5 NGOs nonetheless
consider its standards "a minimum floor that any environmentally and
socia'ly sensitive project should meet."6 Given the adoption of Bank
guidelines by various economic institutions, it is important to understand
the process by which these standards shape the policies of borrower
countries and influence the interactions among a range of actors, from
government officials and Bank staff to civil society activists.
Transnational legal process, one of the leading theoretical approaches to
international law, can help explain the increasing importance of nonstate
actors like the World Bank in enforcing international norms such as human
rights.7 According to the traditional form of the theory, international norms
penetrate domestic legal systems through norm internalization. Nonstate
actors, including individuals and institutions like the Bank and NGOs,
cooperate with state actors to internalize international norms into domestic
law. A study exclusively of government-to-government interactions would
thus overlook a crucial way in which domestic law is shaped.
The conventional version of this theory, however, fails to account for
the internal dynamics of the transnational legal process as applied to
international institutions like the World Bank. This Note demonstrates that
the processes of norm emergence and internalization are more nuanced than
has been suggested in contemporary normative theories.8 Understanding
Guarantees have drafted a common set of environmental guidelines. The guidelines urge members
undertaking environmental reviews to "benchmark projects ... against the safeguard policies
published by the World Bank Group," particularly the policies on involuntary resettlement,
indigenous peoples, and cultural property. OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit
Guarantees, Updated Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially
Supported Export Credits, 12.1 & n.2, TD/ECG(2005)3 (Feb. 25, 2005), available at
http://webdomino I .oecd.org/olis/2005doc.nsf/Linkto/td-ecg(2005)3.
5. These include the Planafloro project in Brazil; the Narmada Dam in India; and the Three
Gorges Dam in China, which was canceled due to intense outside pressure. Jonathan A. Fox &
L. David Brown, Assessing the Impact of NGO Advocacy Campaigns on World Bank Projects and
Policies, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND
GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 485, 500-03 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998).
6. Press Release, Friends of the Earth et al., Memorandum on Camisea Project Violations of
World Bank Safeguard Policies (Oct. 17, 2002), available at http://www.bicusa.orgbicusa/issues/
misc resources/338.php.
7. Transnational legal process is "the theory and practice of how public and private actors-
nation-states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, non-governmental
organizations, and private individuals-interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and
international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational
law." Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (1996); see
also Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home,
35 Hous. L. REV. 623 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing International Law Home]; Catherine
Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S. "War on Terrorism,"
5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (review essay) [hereinafter Koh, Why Obey?].
8. Existing scholarship in political science discusses the role of international actors in
facilitating norm internalization in states. See, e.g., MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK,
ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998);
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,
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these processes requires not simply an examination of the Bank's written
policies but, more importantly, an analysis of the internal deliberations
within the institution over how to interpret and implement those policies. I
argue that a number of factors shape the Bank's influence over human
rights norm compliance in borrower countries. These factors can constrain
or facilitate norm internalization.
The Bank's effectiveness in bringing about the internalization of
indigenous rights norms in borrower countries depends on both external
factors (domestic legal and political constraints and the level of civil society
resistance) and internal ones (power relations within the institution).
Domestic constraints exist in countries with inadequate legal frameworks
for recognizing indigenous rights. In the face of these constraints, the
institutional culture of the Bank is often divided on whether to apply the
Bank's policy on indigenous peoples. Civil society activists may then
exploit internal tensions and forge alliances with advocates within the Bank
who are pushing for policy compliance. As a result, minority voices within
the institution, often including non-economist social scientists, can exert
greater influence on how indigenous-peoples-related issues are addressed in
development projects. Studying how tensions are resolved and what factors
lead staff to apply or not apply the Bank's indigenous peoples policy
requires an analysis of the organizational culture of the Bank and how the
institution (acting as a single unit) interacts with outside actors. A revised
version of transnational legal process theory must account for these external
and internal factors.
When studying the relationship between state and nonstate actors, one
must recognize that all actors-including international institutions like the
Bank-are diverse and may be rife with internal conflict. Most studies of
the Bank have overlooked the internal divisions between departments and
between individuals, instead treating it as a monolithic institution.9 My
analysis of one aspect of the Bank-its approach to indigenous peoples,
who are among the most disadvantaged and marginalized populations in
many areas of the world and are particularly vulne:able to changes caused
by development projects-helps uncover internal disagreements. In projects
affecting indigenous peoples, Bank staff must balance competing interests
in deciding whether and when to apply the indigenous peoples policy and
how to implement the policy once it is applied. As a result, actions are
52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998); Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International
Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999). But this
literature fails to describe how states can socialize international actors to neglect or even violate
the actors' own norms.
9. See, e.g., 50 YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Kevin Danaher ed., 1994); 1-3 IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE
WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD (1991, 1995, 2000); SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2001).
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continuously contested and renegotiated within the institution itself. These
internal contestations often correspond to divisions between competing
interest groups and are most pronounced in regard to countries where
domestic legal systems do not recognize indigenous peoples or sufficiently
address indigenous-peoples-related issues. For example, economists may
disagree with environmentalists and anthropologists over whether to apply
the indigenous peoples policy in a borrower country where there are no
legal provisions that recognize special rights for indigenous peoples.
The Bank's approach to indigenous rights is, therefore, a useful lens for
understanding the institution's role in the transnational legal process, where
international norms seep into domestic law, often in the face of competing
national self-interest. The dynamics of this process shed light on how the
Bank balances its mandate of poverty reduction with human-rights-related
concerns. They also have implications for the role of international
institutions in the transnational legal process. In rethinking this theory, I
offer a more nuanced model of norm emergence and internalization that
takes account of the experience of the Bank with respect to indigenous
rights. I acknowledge that my argument assumes that the Bank should be
involved in the promotion of human rights in general and indigenous rights
in particular. While there are counterarguments in favor of an exclusively
economic focus for the Bank, a discussion of that debate is beyond the
scope of this Note.
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I demonstrates how the World
Bank shapes the domestic law of borrower countries. I examine the Bank's
exercise of legal authority over countries through two mechanisms,
attaching policy conditionalities to loans and incorporating its operational
policies into loan agreements, both of which enable international norms to
penetrate domestic legal systems.
Part II traces the Bank's involvement in indigenous rights and presents
a case study of a Bank loan proposed for Morocco in the early 1990s.
Through this case study, I highlight the domestic political and legal
constraints Bank staff sometimes face when operationalizing the indigenous
peoples policy, as well as the role of civil society activists in influencing
how the Bank overcomes these constraints.
The experience of the Bank with respect to indigenous rights offers
lessons for how to rethink transnational legal process theory. In Part III, I
analyze the processes of norm emergence and internalization from the
vantage point of one institution and its internal and external relations. I then
turn to a prescriptive account of how to achieve internalization of
indigenous rights norms in the Bank and in borrower countries. The
Conclusion suggests possible implications of this analysis for the
anthropology of international institutions more generally.
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I. HOW THE WORLD BANK SHAPES DOMESTIC LAW
The World Bank has emerged as an important actor in the international
law community since its founding in 1944. It exercises political and
economic leverage over countries through loan and credit agreements,
which are binding under the international law of treaties.' 0 Because it
conditions these agreements on compliance with its operational standards, it
can incorporate specific policy and institutional reforms into domestic legal
systems. By exerting control over the policies of borrower countries, the
Bank can play a vital role in the internalization and domestic enforcement
of international law.
As an international organization, the Bank is more than just a collection
of individual member states; it also serves as a governance institution with
its own international legal personality. Its status as a legal person means it
can both execute and be subject to international responsibilities and
obligations, possibly including obligations incumbent on it under
international agreements and customary international law." The Bank
possesses a range of powers necessary to discharge its functions and fulfill
its purposes, particularly poverty alleviation and economic development. Its
Articles of Agreement provide that it "shall possess full juridical
personality, and, in particular, the capacity: (i) to contract; (ii) to acquire
and dispose of immovable and movable property; [and] (iii) to institute
legal proceedings.' 12 Most importantly, it has the capacity to enter into loan
and credit agreements.' 3 The Bank and borrower countries have a
responsibility to carry out these legally binding agreements.
In order to understand the nature of the Bank's legal authority over
countries, I describe two mechanisms by which the Bank influences the
behavior and policies of borrower countries: policy conditionalities and
operational standards.
10. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Policy Guidance and Compliance: The World Bank
Operational Standards, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 281, 282 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
11. While the scope of the Bank's obligations under international law is an unresolved
question, legal scholars and advocates have increasingly argued that the institution is subject to
international treaties, regardless of whether a borrower country has signed on to those treaties.
See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1996); Gunther Handl, The Legal Mandate of Multilateral Development
Banks as Agents for Change Toward Sustainable Development, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1998);
Fergus MacKay, Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself? Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights
and the World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, 17 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 527 (2002).
12. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
art. VII, § 2, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1440, 1457 (1945), 2 U.N.T.S. 134, 180 (1947) [hereinafter
Articles of Agreement].
13. C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 102 (1996).
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A. Policy Conditionalities
While the Bank may exercise its influence informally through the use of
oral commitments, supplemental letters, solicited and unsolicited advice,
and letters of intent,14 loan agreements are the primary mechanism through
which it shapes domestic law. The Bank attaches conditionalities to loan
agreements for policy-based lending. 15 A policy conditionality is "a set of
requirements and preconditions that the recipient country is expected to
meet in order to receive financial assistance." 16 According to the Articles of
Agreement, such preconditions "ensure that the proceeds of any loan are
used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due
attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to
political or other non-economic influences or considerations." 17 If the
country fails to meet these conditionalities, the Bank has the right to stop
disbursing funds.
For instance, the Bank has conditioned loan disbursement for
hydroelectric projects on the recipient country's reducing government
energy subsidies and decreasing the role of the government in energy
production. 18 In addition to these economic policy reforms, Bank loans for
hydroelectric projects have also required that the country address relocation
and environmental concerns. Satisfactory implementation of these
conditions has been a precondition for additional loan disbursements.
Policy conditionalities have generated substantial debate in the
development community, both inside and outside the Bank, over their
effectiveness in generating proposed reforms and supporting country
ownership. They are sometimes considered intrusions on a country's
sovereignty, especially when the borrower country is under great financial
pressure to accept a loan. In its 1992 Wapenhans Report, the Bank's
Operations Evaluation Department acknowledged the one-sidedness of
14. EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS
420 (1973).
15. The Bank has two basic types of lending instruments: investment loans and development
policy loans (formerly known as adjustment loans). Investment loans have a long-term focus (five
to ten years) and finance goods, works, and services in support of economic and social
development projects in a broad range of sectors. Development policy (or policy-based) loans
have a short-term focus (one to three years) and provide quickly disbursed external financing to
support policy and institutional reforms. Conditionalities are more commonly used in policy-based
lending. WORLD BANK, A GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK 47-49 (2003); 1 WORLD BANK, THE
WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, at OP 8.60 (2004), http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/
Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf [hereinafter OPERATIONAL MANUAL] (Development Policy
Lending).
16. OPERATIONS POLICY & COUNTRY SERVS., WORLD BANK, REVIEW OF WORLD BANK
CONDITIONALITY: ISSUES NOTE 4 (2005).
17. Articles of Agreement, supra note 12, art. III, § 5(b), 60 Stat. at 1444, 2 U.N.T.S. at 146.
18. Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the
Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 159, 167 (1993).
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negotiations between the Bank and borrower countries. 9 According to the
report, borrowers complained that "[d]uring negotiations, the Bank
overpowers borrowers-and the country negotiating team often doesn't
have the strength to resist.,'
20
Critics also contend that conditionalities may not directly relate to the
success of the project or the repayment of the loan. Instead, they may be
extensions of the Bank's development ideology and its vision of the
country's long-term economic future. Studies have shown that there is a
positive relationship between policy-based loan success rates and a
country's economic track record.2' As a result, there have been proposals to
replace ex ante commitments with results-oriented approaches where aid
would be allocated only to countries with favorable policy environments.
22
B. Operational Policies
In addition to imposing policy conditionalities on borrower countries,
the Bank also influences domestic policymaking through its operational
policies. These policies, approved by the Bank's Board of Executive
Directors, guide staff practice and ensure that operations are financially,
socially, and environmentally sound. They provide explicit requirements for
the design, appraisal, and implementation of Bank-financed development
projects. While operational policies are mandatory for Bank staff, other
standards, such as Bank procedures and good practices, are merely
recommended. 23 Of particular importance are the so-called safeguard
policies designed to avoid or mitigate detrimental impacts of Bank activities
19. PORTFOLIO MGMT. TASK FORCE, WORLD BANK, EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION: KEY TO
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT (Discussion Draft 1992) [hereinafter WAPENHANS REPORT].
20. Id. Annex B, at 3.
21. See, e.g., Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies, and Growth, 90 AM. ECON. REV.
847 (2000). For a review of the debates over policy conditionalities, see OPERATIONS POLICY &
COUNTRY SERVS., supra note 16; and Stefan G. Koeberle, Should Policy-Based Lending Still
Involve Conditionality?, 18 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 249 (2003).
22. An example of a performance-based lending program is the Millennium Challenge
Account, a recently created U.S. foreign aid program to provide money to countries with sound
policies, based on sixteen performance indicators. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. D, tit. VI, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. (118 Stat.) 3, 211-26 (to be codified at
22 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7718) (Millennium Challenge Act of 2003).
23. The distinction between mandatory and recommended standards is important for the
applicability of complaint procedures. Only mandatory operational policies fall within the
jurisdiction of the World Bank Inspection Panel, a quasi-independent forum created in 1993 for
local citizens to file complaints against the Bank for failure to follow its own policies. See Daniel
D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank
Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 553, 576-79 (1994); Benedict Kingsbury, Operational
Policies of International Institutions as Part of the Law-Making Process: The World Bank and
Indigenous Peoples, in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN
BROWNLIE 323, 330-32 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999).
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on certain groups of people (e.g., indigenous peoples) and on the
environment (e.g., natural habitats).
24
While the primary purpose of operational policies is to guide staff in
their activities, the Bank often incorporates provisions from its policies into
its loan and credit agreements. For instance, as part of its loan agreement, a
borrower country may be required to adopt and implement a resettlement
action plan designed in accordance with the Bank's operational policy on
25involuntary resettlement. As mentioned earlier, the Bank's loan and credit
agreements are legally binding treaties that are part of international law. By
conditioning loans on compliance with operational policies, the Bank plays
a crucial role in affecting the behavior and institutional framework of
borrower countries. A country's breach of a loan agreement gives the Bank
reason to suspend disbursements, although such a threat rarely materializes.
Instead, the Bank may limit its involvement in future projects in the country
for fear of further noncompliance with Bank policies.26 Bank staff members
who fail to enforce the standards are subject to investigation by the Bank's
Inspection Panel.27
The Bank can extend its influence over borrower countries by
promoting compliance with other types of international law as part of its
operational policies.28 Its operational policies on environmental assessment
and forests, for example, mandate that a "project [be] consistent with
domestic law and that it . not contravene any international
[environmental] treaties to which the borrower country is a party. 29 When
24. There are ten safeguard policies on a range of topics: cultural property, environmental
assessment, forests, indigenous peoples, involuntary resettlement, natural habitats, pest
management, projects in disputed areas, projects on international waterways, and safety of dams.
2 OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 15 (Project Requirements). With the approval of pilot
operations for a new country systems approach, designed to increase country ownership and
facilitate harmonization among development agencies, the Bank may be starting to slowly shift
away from applying safeguard policies. Under the country systems approach, when a country's
environmental and social safeguard systems are deemed "equivalent" to Bank standards, the Bank
will apply national systems rather than its own safeguard policies for project preparation and
implementation. OPERATIONS POLICY & COUNTRY SERVS., WORLD BANK, ISSUES IN USING
COUNTRY SYSTEMS IN BANK OPERATIONS 9-10 (2004).
25. Compliance with the Bank's policy on involuntary resettlement would thus be a policy
conditionality attached to the loan. See 2 OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 15, OP 4.12
(Involuntary Resettlement).
26. Kingsbury, supra note 23, at 338-39.
27. See supra note 23.
28. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 10, at 282.
29. Id. at 287; see 2 OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 15, OP 4.01 (Environmental
Assessment); 2 id. OP 4.36 (Forests). In consultations over the Bank's revision of its indigenous
peoples policy, many NGOs and indigenous peoples have called on the Bank to incorporate
similar language into the policy that would "prohibit funding of projects or programmes that risk
contravening the borrowers' international obligations on human rights and the environment."
Bank Information Ctr., Indigenous Delegates' Statement to the World Bank at the Indigenous
Peoples Roundtable (Oct. 17-18, 2002) (unpublished document), http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/
issues/miscresources/541.php; see also Forest Peoples Programme, Critique by the Forest
Peoples Programme of the World Bank's December 2004 Draft Revised Policy on Indigenous
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international standards are higher than those contained in national law, the
Bank's mandatory policies call for application of the former. The Bank's
policy on disclosure of information 30 also follows international standards on
access to information, public awareness, and participation in
decisionmaking. 31 Likewise, its cultural property policy, currently under
revision, makes explicit reference to country obligations under international
treaties, such as the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 2 In addition, its operational policy on
pest management sets minimum standards in accordance with international
guidelines issued by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).33
Even when not explicitly referred to, international instruments are often
considered for interpretive purposes in implementing best practices.34
Moreover, operational policies and procedures may themselves acquire
the status of customary norms by serving as models for national legislation
and for the policies of other multilateral development banks. The formation
of customary rules of international law arises out of general practice by
states accompanied by an acceptance of the practice as law-what is called
the opinio juris.35 The legal legitimacy of custom rests on the international
community's adoption of custom formation as an appropriate method of
rule creation.36
In the case of the World Bank, its operational policies may become
"guidelines for other investors, including both bilateral aid agencies and
private sector lenders, some of whom are anxious to reduce risk and secure
an imprimatur from a high-status body with expert project personnel such
as the World Bank., 37 The Bank's policy on environmental assessment, first
introduced in 1989, is a notable example. 38 It inspired similar guidelines at
the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, several bilateral
Peoples (OP 4.10) (Dec. 23, 2004) (unpublished document), http://www.forestpeoples.org/
BrieffmgsfWorld%20Bank/wb-ip-dftpol_4_10_dec04-eng.htm.
30. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK POLICY ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION (2002).
31. See Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 (1999).
32. See 2 OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 15, OPN 11.03 (Management of Cultural
Property in Bank-Financed Projects) (mentioning the U.N. definition of cultural heritage,
expressed in the 1972 Convention); Boisson de Chazoumes, supra note 10, at 298; see also
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972,
27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 15 1. The revised OP 4.11, which will replace OPN 11.03, is under
preparation.
33. 2 OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 15, OP 4.09, 7 n.7 (Pest Management) ("The
FAO's Guidelines for Packaging and Storage of Pesticides (Rome, 1985), Guidelines on Good
Labeling Practice for Pesticides (Rome, 1985), and Guidelines for the Disposal of Waste
Pesticide and Pesticide Containers on the Farm (Rome, 1985) are used as minimum standards.").
34. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 10, at 299.
35. JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 238 (1980).
36. Id. at 244.
37. Kingsbury, supra note 23, at 339.
38. 2 OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 15, OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment).
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donors, and various private-sector firms..3 9 In addition, the Rio Declaration,
drafted at the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development,
mandates that an environmental impact assessment requirement be
incorporated into national legislation and regulations. 40  This cross-
fertilization of international and Bank standards highlights the prominent
role that Bank operational policies play in the development of customary
international law norms.41
II. OPERATIONALIZING THE BANK'S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES POLICY:
A CASE STUDY OF A LOAN TO MOROCCO
Among the various areas in which the Bank has shaped domestic law,
one of the most overlooked is indigenous peoples' rights. Given its day-to-
day experience carrying out development projects that directly or indirectly
affect indigenous peoples, the Bank has become a critical international
player in the formulation of indigenous rights norms. Its projects have the
potential to have a significant impact on the social and economic welfare of
these peoples. Therefore, how the Bank approaches indigenous rights can
have serious consequences.
The Bank entered the dialogue over indigenous rights norms in 1982,
when it became the first multilateral financial institution to introduce a
special policy on indigenous peoples, Operational Manual Statement 2.34.
In 1991, it issued a revised policy statement, Operational Directive (OD)
4.20.42 OD 4.20 applies to all Bank-financed projects identified as affecting
indigenous peoples. It requires a "culturally appropriate" development plan
"based on the informed participation" of the peoples themselves.43 It aims
39. Kingsbury, supra note 23, at 339.
40. U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, princ. 17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1) (June 13, 1992)
("Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed
activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to
a decision of a competent national authority.").
41. See Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 10, at 300. Cross-fertilization also occurs in the
opposite direction, whereby the World Bank revises its policies to keep up with developments in
organizations like the United Nations and the International Labour Organization. See, e.g.,
Kingsbury, supra note 23, at 341.
42. 2 OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 15, OD 4.20 (Indigenous Peoples). In 1998, the
Bank began to revise OD 4.20 into a new policy, Operational Policy (OP) 4.10. World Bank, Draft
OP 4.10, http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/63ByDocName/PoliciesRevisedDraft
OperationalPolicyonlndigenousPeoplesRevisedDraftOP410 (last edited Dec. 1, 2004). The Bank
conducted public consultations over a revised draft policy from December 2004 until February
2005. Its Board of Executive Directors will soon consider the policy for approval. If approved, OP
4.10 will replace the existing Bank policy, OD 4.20. The Bank also plans to release a
corresponding draft Bank Procedures (BP) 4.10 and an implementation guide and sourcebook.
World Bank Group, Indigenous Peoples, http:/Ilnwebl8.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/
63ByDocName/IndigenousPeoples (last visited Apr. 28, 2005).
43. 2 OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 15, OD 4.20, 8, 14(a) (emphasis omitted)
(Indigenous Peoples).
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to ensure that "the development process fosters full respect for the[] dignity,
human rights, and cultural uniqueness" of indigenous peoples. 4
Yet the Bank's institutional practices regarding indigenous peoples
diverge from its written policy. A 2003 report by the Bank's Operations
Evaluation Department (OED), an independent unit within the Bank that
reports directly to its Board of Executive Directors, found that only 55 of
the 89 projects (or about 62% of the projects) that could have potentially
affected indigenous peoples (as determined by the OED's application of the
policy's stated criteria) actually applied OD 4.20.41 Of the 55 projects that
applied the policy, only 32 (or 58% of the 55) were assessed to have done
so in a satisfactory or highly satisfactory way.46
There is a disjuncture between the Bank's articulation of its indigenous
peoples policy and its day-to-day application.47 Bridging this gap requires
an analysis of the Bank's difficulties in operationalizing the policy. In order
to illustrate these practical constraints, I present a case study of a loan to
Morocco that the Bank planned in the early 1990s. After describing the
circumstances surrounding the loan, I discuss domestic political and legal
constraints that likely discouraged some Bank staff from applying the
policy. Finally, I describe the role of civil society activists in exploiting
tensions within the Bank and thereby promoting policy implementation.
A. Deciding Who Are Indigenous Peoples
When attempting to operationalize the indigenous peoples policy, Bank
employees are often influenced by a country's political stance with respect
to indigenous peoples. For example, there are some countries, like
44. 2 id. 16.
45. OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEP'T, WORLD BANK, REPORT NO. 25,332,
IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.20 ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: AN
INDEPENDENT DESK REVIEW 3.4 (2003) [hereinafter OED DESK REVIEW]. The OED examined
all 234 projects that were appraised after 1992, when OD 4.20 came into effect, and closed before
May 2001. Id. 3.1. When determining whether the operational directive had been applied to
projects, it looked for projects with an indigenous peoples development plan or with elements of
an indigenous peoples plan, "namely: sound diagnosis of issues related to IP [indigenous peoples],
participation of IP in project design and implementation, measures to protect the interests of IP,
and monitoring indicators for IP-related results." Id. 1.13. The OED also considered projects that
lacked these elements to varying degrees but included other measures to protect indigenous
peoples. Id. It should be noted, however, that the OED found marked improvement in the degree
and quality of policy implementation in projects approved after 1998, when the Bank began to
devote more attention to safeguard policies. Id. attachment 1, 7.
46. Id. 3.12. The OED rated projects as applying the policy in a satisfactory or highly
satisfactory way if they included a sound diagnosis of issues related to indigenous peoples,
participation of indigenous peoples in design and implementation, and measures to protect the
interests of indigenous peoples. Projects that lacked a sound diagnosis of issues were rated
moderately satisfactory, while those with lower levels of participation or no participation were
rated moderately unsatisfactory or unsatisfactory. Id. at 17 tbl.3.3.
47. See generally Kingsbury, supra note 23, at 338-39 (discussing the indigenous peoples
policy and the processes of policy adoption, application, and supervision within the Bank).
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Morocco, whose governments do not recognize ethnic minorities within
their borders as indigenous or provide only limited rights for these
minorities in their legal systems. Approving a loan in these countries
becomes more problematic when there are disagreements within the Bank
about whether these peoples are in fact indigenous and thus require special
protections that countries do not want to institute.
When a country contests the Bank's recognition of an ethnic group as
indigenous, the Bank faces two undesirable options: (1) canceling the loan
on the ground that the country is refusing to comply with the indigenous
peoples policy or (2) proceeding with the loan without implementing the
special provisions required by the policy, thereby conceding the country's
position that there are no indigenous peoples within its borders. This
dilemma is exacerbated when the country is in dire need of funding due to
high poverty rates. Should the Bank's poverty-reduction strategy supersede
its indigenous rights strategy?
Bank employees faced this situation when they considered a proposed
loan to Morocco called the Second Agricultural Sector Investment Loan,
which had the potential to adversely affect Morocco's Berber population.
The project would finance countrywide interventions on forest land, support
the revision of laws that limit the Berber communities' rights to benefit
from forest resources, and facilitate the granting of land titles in land reform
areas.48 Because the Berber people inhabit these forest areas, the question of
whether to consider them indigenous was crucial.
The answer to this question was contested within the Bank, partly as a
result of a lack of clarity in the policy itself. The Bank's indigenous peoples
policy states that "[b]ecause of the varied and changing contexts in which
indigenous peoples are found, no single definition can capture their
diversity. 49 It identifies a group as indigenous according to
the presence in varying degrees of the following characteristics:
(a) a close attachment to ancestral territories and to the natural
resources in these areas;
(b) self-identification and identification by others as members
of a distinct cultural group;
(c) an indigenous language, often different from the national
language;
(d) presence of customary social and political institutions; and
48. OED DESK REVIEW, supra note 45, at 13 box 3.1.
49. 2 OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 15, OD 4.20, 5 (Indigenous Peoples).
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(e) primarily subsistence-oriented production.50
There is no particular formula for the relative importance of each criterion.
While national constitutions and relevant legislation provide "a preliminary
basis," identification ultimately relies on the judgment of Bank staff with
regional technical expertise. 5 1 Due to the diversity of perspectives within
the Bank-along disciplinary and geographic lines, among others-many
views need to be reconciled or rejected before the Bank can reach a final
decision.
In the case of the loan to Morocco, Bank managers ultimately decided
not to recognize the Berbers as indigenous and, therefore, not to apply the
indigenous peoples policy.5 2 The Second Agricultural Sector Investment
Loan was approved on June 23, 1994. In an OED report, management
explained its decision not to apply the policy to the Berbers: "Taking into
account the social, cultural, and political context, [Bank staff] therefore
determined that the OD did not apply."53 However, an independent desk
review of this loan conducted by the OED and fortified by the views of an
expert panel concluded that the Berbers meet the criteria for indigenous
peoples listed in OD 4.20.4
Why did some Bank managers disagree with the OED and ultimately
decide not to apply OD 4.20 to the Berbers? And why did certain Bank staff
who felt that the policy should not be applied to the Berbers win out over
those who felt that it should be applied? I answer the first question by
describing the domestic political and legal constraints that shape Bank
decisionmaking. I respond to the second by illustrating the importance of
civil society activists who form alliances with interest groups within the
Bank.
B. Domestic Political and Legal Constraints
Morocco's legal and political situation likely influenced Bank staff
judgment about whether to label the Berbers as an indigenous people. There
is little consensus in Morocco on whether social groups like the Berbers are
indigenous:55 The legal system does not recognize the Berbers as
indigenous, so the very use of the term "indigenous" was controversial for
the Moroccan government. Government officials may have feared that the
Bank's application of the policy would signal the government's implicit
50. 2 id.
51. 2 id. 4, 4-5.
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recognition of the Berbers as indigenous, possibly leading to internal ethnic
tension or causing the Berbers to mobilize politically for additional rights.56
Determining who is indigenous is sensitive in many countries,
especially in African and Asian countries whose governments often assert
that all inhabitants are equally "indigenous. 57 Countries' definitions of who
is indigenous, or their lack of recognition of any indigenous peoples within
their borders, sometimes -contrast with the classifications made by Bank
staff. Because these countries may have ethnic, possibly indigenous
populations intermixed with other disadvantaged and poor peoples, some
Bank staff have argued that application of the indigenous peoples policy
threatens to create rifts between the indigenous and nonindigenous poor. If
the Bank persisted in pressuring a borrower country to apply the policy, it
might risk upsetting government officials and thereby hindering future
negotiations between that country and the Bank.
For example, the application of OD 4.20 to a project in India raised
concerns among Indian government officials who feared it had the potential
to create tensions among poor ethnic groups. 58 India's Second Water
Supply and Environmental Sanitation Project in Karnataka, approved in
2001, affected the Lambanis and the Siddis, ethnic groups with distinctive
cultural practices who are marginalized and severely disadvantaged and
who could arguably qualify as indigenous peoples under OD 4.20. But from
the Indian government's point of view, the Lambanis' and the Siddis'
"attachment to ancestral lands is not greater than that of other poor social
groups.... [, and thus] it is unclear why they need to be protected under a
special policy when other poor groups that have lived on those lands for
much longer do not enjoy such privileges." 59 As a result, government
officials protested against the application of OD 4.20 and claimed that
"such arbitrary classifications could cause social tensions., 60
The circumstances surrounding the loan to Morocco parallel those in
India and suggest that domestic political factors played a substantial role in
internal Bank decisionmaking. Other loans in politically contentious regions
56. Many countries, such as Morocco,
find it difficult, if not provocative, to make invidious distinctions between groups who
are deemed to be indigenous and groups that are not.... [I]n countries without.., legal
frameworks but with social groups regarded as deserving of protection under the
directive (for example, Morocco, Ethiopia), the very use of the term "indigenous
peoples" may have constrained application of the OD provisions.
Id. 2.8.
57. See Andr6 B~teille, The Idea ofIndigenous People, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 187,
188-91 (1998); Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist
Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 414, 416 (1998).
58. OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEP'T, WORLD BANK, REPORT No. 25,754,
IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.20 ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: AN EVALUATION
OF RESULTS 13 box 2.1 (2003) [hereinafter OED EVALUATION].
59. Id.
60. Id.; see also OED DESK REVIEW, supra note 45, 2.8.
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have suffered the same fate as the loan to Morocco. An evaluation by the
OED states that "[f]or the most part," the indigenous peoples policy has not
been applied in Africa and the Middle East and, within the Europe and
Central Asia region, has only been applied in Russia.6' Yet the OED notes
that some of these countries' ethnic populations should have qualified under
the Bank's own definition of "indigenous. 62 Thus, Bank staff tend to avoid
creating political tensions with borrower governments that would impede
project implementation and country negotiations.
C. Civil Society Activism
The level of civil society activism within borrower countries is another
factor contributing to whether the Bank applies its indigenous peoples
policy. Influential civil society advocates can ally with staff who are
competing for control over decisionmaking within the Bank. Because
heated internal deliberations often accompany controversial loans like the
loan to Morocco, pressure from civil society activists can significantly
influence how indigenous peoples are addressed in Bank projects.
Employees who deal with indigenous peoples and related issues (like
the environment and resettlement) have historically occupied a subordinated
position within the Bank.63 In the words of an NGO representative, "Those
Bank staff who recognize the problems facing indigenous peoples remain a
small minority within the institutional structure and are often located in the
less influential technical (advisory) departments rather than actually having
primary responsibility for loans."64 Michael Cernea, the first non-economist
social scientist hired by the Bank (in 1974), chronicles the increasing
number of anthropologists at the Bank and their growing institutional
weight, especially in the area of policy development. While he hails
substantive changes in the institution's culture spurred by a "critical mass"
of social scientists, he admits that "there is still a long way to go in
mainstreaming and generalizing social analysis in World Bank activities. 65
Different perspectives on social issues have resulted in clashes over
how to address the rights of indigenous peoples when they are implicated in
controversial but potentially profitable development projects. In the case of
61. OED EVALUATION, supra note 58, 2.11.
62. OED DESK REVIEW, supra note 45, at 13 box 3.1.
63. For a discussion of the position of non-economist social scientists, see, for example,
MICHAEL M. CERNEA, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT ANTHROPOLOGY: THE 1995
MALINOWSKI AWARD LECTURE 4-8 (World Bank, Environmentally Sustainable Dev. Studies &
Monographs Series, No. 6, 1996); and Jonathan Fox, Advocacy Research and the World Bank:
Propositions for Discussion, 13 DEV. PRAC. 519, 523-24 (2003) (discussing the limited influence
of anthropologists working in the Bank).
64. Andrew Gray, Development Policy, Development Protest: The World Bank, Indigenous
Peoples, and NGOs, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 5, at 267, 290.
65. CERNEA, supra note 63, at 13-14 (emphasis omitted).
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the loan to Morocco, there were likely minority voices within the Bank who
advocated for identifying the Berbers as indigenous and canceling the loan
following Morocco's refusal to accept the indigenous peoples policy. While
the Bank does not publicize internal discussions among staff that lead to
loan decisions, evidence from other projects concerning indigenous peoples
suggests what may have happened in the case of the loan to Morocco.
For example, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, an internal conflict
arose between the Bank's energy and environment departments over the
Mount Apo geothermal plant project in the Philippines.66 The departments
issued conflicting recommendations on whether the Bank should allocate
funding for the Mount Apo project from an already approved Bank energy
sector loan. Because Mount Apo is one of the richest botanical reserves in
Southeast Asia and the ancestral home of six indigenous groups, a Bank
loan to construct power plants and support oil exploration at the site raised
serious indigenous rights and environmental concerns. While the energy
department expressed support for the geothermal project at Mount Apo, the
environment department wanted to find an alternative site for the project.67
NGOs and local community groups capitalized on this internal division as
they constructed a transnational alliance against the project.68
Because of growing internal and external pressure, the Bank concluded
in mid-1992 that the project proposal did not adequately take account of
local groups or consider the cultural and religious importance of the area to
indigenous peoples.69 As a result, the Philippine government had to
withdraw its request to allocate funding to the project. Why did activists
allied with sympathetic Bank staff ultimately sway internal decisionmaking
over this project while they likely had little influence over the one in
Morocco? The answer lies in the presence of concurrent outside pressure
from a transnational network of activists.
The level of civil society activism in potential borrower countries can
influence how internal conflicts play out within the ranks of Bank
employees. The leverage of environmentalists and anthropologists over
Bank decisionmaking is often strongest when there is concurrent external
pressure by NGOs that are ready to exploit these internal divisions.70 This is
more likely to occur in regions where strong civil society movements exist
66. See Antoinette G. Royo, The Philippines: Against the People's Wishes, the Mt. Apo Story,
in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 5, at 151, 159.
67. Id. at 158-59.
68. Id. at 169.
69. Id. at 160.
70. The cancellation of Nepal's Arun III Hydroelectric Dam was in part due to "the
reciprocal interaction between external critics and . . . insider advocates of environmental and
social concerns within the Bank." Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown, Introduction, in THE
STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 5, at 1, 4. Although a number of factors generally
contribute to the Bank's cancellation of a loan, the alliance between civil society critics and
internal Bank dissidents can play a role.
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and where local NGOs have ties to international NGOs (often based in the
United States or Europe). The most politically mobilized community-based
organizations and NGOs concerned with indigenous rights exist in Latin
America, as compared to those in Africa and Asia.71 High levels of civil
society participation can create external pressure on the Bank. This pressure
strengthens the hand of Bank staff who are advocating for the application of
the indigenous peoples policy, especially when governments are reluctant to
institute the required protections.
Part of the reason for the discrepancy in civil society activism across
geographic regions is that countries in Latin America have generally been
more supportive of indigenous rights than those in other regions: Of the
seventeen countries that have ratified International Labor Convention 169
(the only legally binding international instrument on indigenous and tribal
peoples), thirteen are Latin American and Caribbean countries.72 In
countries with supportive political and legal environments for indigenous
rights, civil society organizations are often allowed to thrive, which enables
them to exert influence over Bank decisionmaking and push the Bank
toward rigorous application of the indigenous peoples policy.
73
According to an OED evaluation, countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean adopted an approach that was highly consistent with that
required by OD 4.20. 74 In contrast, even when OD 4.20 was applied to
countries in Africa and the Middle East, the approach adopted to protect
indigenous peoples was typically inconsistent with the approach outlined in
the policy. 75 Uneven policy application across geographic regions is also
apparent with respect to the Bank's involuntary resettlement policy, with
the Latin America and Caribbean region receiving the highest performance
rating.76 Thus, a borrower country's political and legal climate and the level
71. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of
International Law?, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 70-78 (1994); Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and
Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 57, 74-92 (1999).
72. International Labour Organisation: Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, adopted June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept.
5, 1991).
73. See Kingsbury, supra note 23, at 328 ("In other [borrowing] states, especially where
indigenous groups are politically organized and familiar with Bank policy, the Bank is almost
inevitably drawn into processes of social group self-identification and definition.... [T]he Bank
has sometimes worked directly with indigenous political organizations where the state government
accepts this.").
74. OED EVALUATION, supra note 58, 1 2.16.
75. Id. 2.18.
76. A 1994 Bank report documented disparities across regions in the amount of Bank
supervision in projects over the implementation of resettlement plans. It found that Bank task
managers in Latin America and the Caribbean supervised on a regular basis, with 100% of
projects supervised at least once per year. In contrast, the amount of supervision for resettlement
projects in other regions was less regular or intermittent-68% of projects in South Asia, 50% in
Europe and Central Asia, 47% in Africa, 42% in East Asia and the Pacific, and 33% in the Middle
East and North Africa. ENVT. DEP'T, WORLD BANK, PAPER NO. 032, RESETTLEMENT AND
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of civil society activism may facilitate the effective operationalizing of
indigenous rights norms.
III. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS NORM COMPLIANCE
Conventional scholarship on norms emphasizes the way international
institutions like the World Bank pressure states to comply with international
norms. 77 Yet this focus fails to explain the fluid role played by the Bank in
norm compliance-i.e., how domestic actors may exert pressure on the
Bank to neglect or even violate its own norms. Rather than serving as the
agent of influence over borrower countries with respect to indigenous rights
norms, the Bank can sometimes serve as the object of influence and, as a
result, appear to be a mere follower in the process of norm compliance. This
occurs in situations where state governments have a strong power base and
refuse to implement Bank standards that are inconsistent with their less
rigorous national safeguard systems. In Part II, I demonstrated that
implementation of Bank policies may be influenced by domestic political
and legal constraints and levels of civil society activism. In this Part, I
explain what this phenomenon indicates about the institution's fluid role in
the transnational legal process. I then propose a strategy for promoting
indigenous rights norm internalization within borrower countries and the
Bank itself.
A. Rethinking the Dynamics of Norm Emergence and Internalization
This study of the World Bank and its indigenous peoples policy can
help us understand how theories of norm compliance, particularly
78transnational legal process theory, can be applied in practice.
Transnational legal process theory aims to explain how "interlinked rules of
domestic and international law develop, and [how] interlinked processes of
domestic and international compliance come about., 79 It derives from the
international legal process school, whose proponents included Abram
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, and Andreas
Lowenfeld. ° International legal process scholars were interested in how
DEVELOPMENT: THE BANKWIDE REVIEW OF PROJECTS INVOLVING INVOLUNTARY
RESETTLEMENT 1986-1993, at 154-56 & tbl.6.1 (1996).
77. See, e.g., Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 8.
78. See Koh, Why Obey?, supra note 7.
79. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 56
(2004).
80. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); 1-2 ABRAM CHAYES,
THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS
FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE (1968); THOMAS EHRLICH & MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (1993).
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law works in international society and how international rules are
incorporated in political decisionmaking. Transnational legal process theory
extends this inquiry into a study of the relationship between international
norms and domestic legal processes in an attempt to answer the question of
why nations obey international law.
The theory outlines three phases: interaction, interpretation, and
internalization. What I refer to as norm emergence corresponds to the
interaction phase. According to the theory's most vocal proponent, Harold
Koh,
One or more transnational actors provokes an interaction (or series
of interactions) with another, which forces an interpretation or
enunciation of the global norm applicable to the situation. By so
doing, the moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party,
but to internalize the new interpretation of the international norm
into the other party's internal normative system.81
This process is catalyzed by "transnational norm entrepreneurs" (i.e.,
nongovernmental actors, both individuals and organizations) and
transnational issue networks, which advocate for the adoption and diffusion
of new norms.82 The key factor in the transnational legal process is repeated
participation, which "helps to reconstitute national interests, to establish the
identity of actors as ones who obey the law, and to develop the norms that
become part of the fabric of emerging international society.
8 3
While norm emergence and internalization are critical moments in the
transnational legal process, the dynamics of these stages have been
insufficiently elucidated in previous literature.8 4 I have shown that in the
interaction (or emergence) stage, external actors can exploit tensions within
an international institution and play the institution against itself.
Furthermore, in the internalization stage, governments both influence and
are influenced by the World Bank. Thus, one must supplement the
conventional model of transnational legal process theory with a more
nuanced version.
A conventional version of transnational legal process theory as applied
to the Bank and indigenous rights norms would proceed as follows: First,
norm entrepreneurs and transgovernmental advocacy networks trigger
interactions with the Bank and put indigenous rights considerations on its
agenda. Second, the Bank interprets its mandate and Articles of Agreement
81. Koh, Why Obey?, supra note 7, at 2646.
82. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 647, 649. For a discussion of
issue networks, see KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 8.
83. Koh, Why Obey?, supra note 7, at 2655.
84. See David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 Nw. U. L.
REv. 879, 881 (2003) ("Transnational legal process theory fails to explain how human rights
principles become internalized domestically.").
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to allow for the recognition of indigenous rights norms, particularly through
the adoption of an indigenous peoples policy. Third, the Bank implements
its policy in borrower countries and provokes the internalization of
indigenous rights norms into domestic law. In this manner, international
norms win approval and lead to domestic compliance.
Here is the more nuanced version of transnational legal process theory
that I propose: First, norm entrepreneurs and transgovernmental advocacy
networks trigger interactions with the Bank. Concurrently, advocates within
the Bank pressure it to adopt reforms. Resulting alliances between internal
and external advocates create a dialogue over how to balance indigenous
rights and development goals. The advocates succeed in putting indigenous
rights considerations on the institution's agenda. Second, the Bank
interprets its mandate and Articles of Agreement to allow for the
recognition of indigenous rights norms, particularly through the adoption of
an indigenous peoples policy. Third, the Bank attempts to implement its
policy in borrower countries and provoke the internalization of indigenous
rights norms into domestic law. Aided by civil society activists, it sometimes
must overcome domestic legal and political constraints, which threaten to
reverse the process of norm internalization by pressuring the Bank itself not
to comply with its own norms.
This version, particularly its account of the interaction and norm
internalization stages, is substantiated by the Bank's historical progression
toward adopting human-rights-related reforms, including norms on
indigenous peoples' rights. First, I discuss the interaction phase. In the
1980s and early 1990s, human rights NGOs and indigenous peoples
pressured the Bank to adopt an operational policy in accordance with
indigenous rights norms being formulated in a variety of public
international legal forums. 85  Disaffected Bank employees, often
anthropologists and sociologists who felt that their voices were being
ignored in Bank decisionmaking, supported the campaign of external
advocates. These internal reformers increased pressure on management to
85. Customary international law on the rights of indigenous peoples has been slowly
emerging over the past two decades as part of a growing international movement for indigenous
rights. See, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 61-72 (2d ed.
2004) (tracing the emergence of norms of customary international law on indigenous peoples from
early activity at the United Nations in the 1970s to the writing of the U.N. Draft Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1994 and the case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001), before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2001). The global process of indigenous standard
setting is taking place in a variety of forums, including the International Labour Organization, the
United Nations, and the Organization of American States. See International Labour Organisation,
supra note 72; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add1 (Aug.
26, 1994); Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEA/Ser.LN/H.95, doc. 7 rev. 625 (1997), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/
96eng/chap.4.htm.
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place more emphasis on other noneconomic concerns such as civil society
participation, the environment, and the displacement of vulnerable
populations.86 For example, Bank social scientists employed NGO pressure
to urge the Bank to develop a formal policy on involuntary resettlement in
1980.87 This evidence suggests the contested nature of decisionmaking
within the Bank, which allowed for a dialogic process of norm emergence
between internal and external actors.
Once its indigenous peoples policy was adopted, the Bank began to
apply the policy to borrower countries to encourage them to internalize
indigenous rights norms. These countries often embrace such norms in
order to enhance their reputation in the international community and secure
loans from the Bank. But additional evidence demonstrates that this is not
always the case: Norm internalization may depart from the conventional
model in cases where the Bank faces domestic political and legal
constraints when attempting to influence countries to internalize these
norms.
When countries express an unwillingness to comply with the
indigenous peoples policy, the Bank may be induced not to apply the
policy, unless it faces enough civil society pressure. Institutional incentives
further motivate employees to approve loans to these countries. As a result,
the Bank ends up not implementing its own norms. By not applying its
policy in situations when it should, it becomes a norm breaker.88 In other
words, while international organizations like the Bank often act as agents of
norm internalization in countries, they may sometimes become the objects
of reverse norm internalization. The Bank's failure to comply with its own
norms threatens to undermine its attempts to achieve norm compliance in
borrower countries.
B. A Two-Pronged Strategy for Norm Internalization
Why has the World Bank's participation in the transnational legal
process not translated into consistently effective implementation of its
indigenous peoples policy in borrower countries? In following the
86. See Jonathan A. Fox, When Does Reform Policy Influence Practice? Lessons from the
Bankwide Resettlement Review, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 5, at 303,
334 ("Although dealing with NGO critics can provoke ideological and professional dissonance,
insider reformists are nevertheless well aware that advocacy groups create an enabling
environment that bolsters their own leverage.").
87. The involuntary resettlement policy was amended in 1986 and 1990 and made public in
1988. Id. at 308.
88. Whether the Bank is prompted to grant loans to countries that violate, or at least
disregard, certain norms may depend on how much value the Bank places on these norms as
opposed to others. Does the Bank's underperformance in implementing its indigenous peoples
policy suggest that indigenous rights is not a norm of high value? The question of which norms
matter under what conditions is beyond the scope of this Note but is worthy of further research.
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normative approach of the new international legal process school, 89 I offer a
strategy for increasing internalization of indigenous rights norms within
both the Bank and borrower countries. While I primarily address these
proposals to indigenous rights advocates, Bank staff would also benefit
from heeding the advice on institutional reform. My prescription for
domestic internalization is not particularly new, but advocates have
underemphasized this strategy in favor of focusing on internalization within
the Bank.
I argue that advocates and Bank staff must invest resources in
promoting internalization within borrower countries. Martha Nussbaum
astutely observes that "the implementation of such principles must be left,
for the most part, to the internal politics of the nation in question, although
international agencies and other governments are justified in using
persuasion-and in especially grave cases economic or political
sanctions-to promote such developments." 90 In other words, an
implementation strategy cannot be effective if it bypasses the state.
In their communications with the Bank, indigenous rights NGOs have
primarily focused on provoking meaningful interactions with Bank
management and attempting to generate a favorable interpretation of norms.
However, they have failed to devote enough efforts to the third and critical
step toward obedience under the transnational legal process theory-norm
internalization. In order to promote compliance with indigenous rights
norms, advocates must encourage internalization in both the Bank and its
borrower countries. Because a borrower country's political position with
respect to indigenous peoples influences the Bank's application of its
policies, I argue for a two-pronged strategy that addresses internalization
within both entities.
Internalizing indigenous rights norms in the culture of the Bank means
incorporating the norms into its identity. The adoption of an indigenous
peoples policy in 1992 represented a first step toward political
internalization within the institution-i.e., when the Bank "elite" accepted
indigenous rights norms and adopted them as a matter of policy.9' However,
this moment of norm enunciation has not led to a pull toward obedience
within the lower ranks of the Bank hierarchy. Political internalization
within the institution has not been sufficient. What is missing is social
internalization, "when a norm acquires so much public legitimacy that there
is widespread general obedience to it.
' 92
89. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 334,
337-39 (1999).
90. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 105 (2000).
91. Koh, Why Obey?, supra note 7, at 2656-57.
92. Id. at 2656.
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Social internalization in the Bank would mean that employees
interpreted indigenous rights promotion as an essential part of the
institution's mandate of poverty reduction. In economic terms, indigenous
rights would be recognized as a global public good. Because indigenous
peoples are among the poorest and most excluded populations in many
countries, promoting their development through culturally compatible
programs would facilitate significant improvements in countries' overall
economic situations. In order to further social internalization, NGOs must
focus on promoting a favorable interpretation of the Bank's Articles of
Agreement, which state that the Bank "shall not interfere in the political
affairs of any member" and that "[o]nly economic considerations shall be
relevant to their decisions." 93 A favorable interpretation of the Articles
would define indigenous rights as not only a political issue but also one
with indirect economic implications.
Social internalization would also require that the Bank address
constraints arising from the institution's staff-incentive structure.
Employees have a financial disincentive to apply the indigenous peoples
policy, which reflects an institutional bias toward time efficiency and
effective resource management: They are rewarded for getting the most
money out the door and carrying out the largest number of loans.94
Applying the policy would mean devoting additional resources to institute
culturally compatible measures (such as indigenous peoples development
plans based on data gathered from anthropological studies conducted by the
Bank) and negotiating with countries that lacked the political will to
comply. 95 Some managers, therefore, view the protection of indigenous
rights as an onerous requirement that stifles their efforts to efficiently
process loans. According to a staff survey conducted by the Bank's
Operations Evaluation Department, "[T]here is a perception among
respondents that task teams do not have adequate resources to implement
the OD. ' ,9 6 Among the respondent comments was the following statement:
"[T]o work in areas with [indigenous peoples] a TTL [task team leader] is
93. Articles of Agreement, supra note 12, art. IV, § 10, 60 Stat. at 1449, 2 U.N.T.S. at 158.
94. Financial concerns also influence the level of compliance with the Bank's environmental
assessment policy. Because full compliance is seen as unreasonably expensive by some borrower
countries and Bank management, "[1]oans go through more smoothly when compliance is not
questioned, satisfying the Bank's financiers and getting borrowers the money they need more
quickly." Natalie Laura Bridgeman, Note, World Bank Reform in the "Post-Policy" Era, 13 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1013, 1025 (2001).
95. An indigenous peoples development plan includes an assessment of the country's legal
framework as it relates to indigenous peoples, baseline data including up-to-date maps and an
analysis of the peoples' social structure and production activities, assistance with the country's
recognition of traditional land tenure systems, and a strategy for local participation. Although the
indigenous peoples development plan is the borrower country's responsibility under OD 4.20,
preparation, appraisal, implementation, and supervision of the plan require significant
involvement and technical assistance by Bank staff. 2 OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 15,
OD 4.20, 15-19 (Indigenous Peoples).
96. OED DESK REVIEW, supra note 45, $ 4.8.
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forced to prepare long descriptive studies, often of no substantial utility in
project design. A TTL thus has an incentive not to involve these areas. 97
The incentive to get the most money out the door means that managers
refrain from enforcing required provisions that may delay the progress of a
loan and increase its expense. Preparing indigenous peoples development
plans and conducting meaningful consultations with indigenous peoples are
two such requirements. Task managers have
a strong incentive to make the loan 'work[,'] .... partly because
their own success depends on effectively managing aid
disbursements and partly because punishments imposed by the
Bank for failing to meet Bank conditions lack moral legitimacy.
The threat not to make subsequent [loan disbursements] available
therefore has relatively€ low credibility, and the Bank learns to
accept partial success.
9
The pressure to lend money was cited in the Bank's 1992 Wapenhans
Report, which studied the effectiveness of its lending operations.99
According to this report, the key reason for the Bank's decreasing portfolio
quality in 1992 was pervasive appraisal optimism and the "loan approval
culture" that motivates staff to give more attention to the quantity of
lending than to its quality. 00 It is imperative that the Bank address these
institutional obstacles, which are impeding social internalization of
indigenous rights norms.
As the second prong of a strategy to implement its indigenous rights
policy, the Bank should facilitate the internalization of indigenous rights
norms in borrower countries. Bank managers should engage in direct
dialogue with country governments over indigenous issues during short-
and long-term project planning and invest additional resources in building
the capacity of indigenous organizations. Countries must recognize that the
protection of indigenous rights serves their national interests because
indigenous peoples often comprise the poorest and most vulnerable segment
of their populations. Although domestic policies that recognize indigenous
rights and provide culturally appropriate protections may provoke political
or ethnic tensions within countries (because of the implication of
differential treatment among citizens and possible historical factors), such
97. Id. at 26 box 4.2. In addition, domestic political obstacles faced by teams that are
preparing indigenous peoples development plans "ha[ve] led to inefficiencies in the application of
the OD." Id. 4.9.
98. Christopher Gilbert et al., Positioning the World Bank, 109 EcON. J. F598, F617 (1999).
99. WAPENHANS REPORT, supra note 19; see also Deborah Moore & Leonard Sklar,
Reforming the World Bank's Lending for Water, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, supra
note 5, at 353, 386; Bridgeman, supra note 94.
100. WAPENHANS REPORT, supra note 19, at 14.
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policies are a necessary step toward the alleviation of high national poverty
rates.
Bank field staff should also address the domestic policy, institutional,
and legal frameworks for indigenous peoples when they prepare a country
assistance strategy (CAS), which presents the Bank's development plan for
a borrower country.101 Including an indigenous peoples development plan
on a countrywide scale, for example, in contrast to the standard project-
specific plans, would be consistent with one of the purposes of a CAS: to
provide "an assessment of ... any governance issues related to the
government's willingness and capacity to carry out needed reforms."' 0 2 The
plan would address long-term domestic legal and political reforms that
would facilitate the application of the Bank's indigenous peoples policy. In
addition, for all projects that may affect indigenous peoples, Bank staff
should work directly with community organizations and include them not
only in the design but also in the implementation, monitoring, and
evaluation of projects. 10 3 Working directly with communities would build
civil society support and thereby strengthen the Bank's efforts to achieve
norm internalization in domestic legal and political systems.
Collaboration with other financial institutions would also increase the
Bank's leverage in its discussions with borrower countries and would
promote a consistent approach to indigenous rights. Like the Bank, many of
these institutions must also negotiate between competing economic and
political interests when they address the situation of indigenous peoples.
Such institutions range from regional development banks (e.g., the Asian
Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the
African Development Bank) to multinational corporations (e.g., Royal
Dutch/Shell, WMC Resources Ltd.), many of which are in the process of
developing their own policies on indigenous peoples. 10 4 If financial
101. The World Bank normally develops a CAS every one to three years in consultation with
the borrower country's government and civil society organizations. This strategy addresses the
country's top development priorities, creditworthiness, and past portfolio performance and the
level of financial and technical assistance that the Bank seeks to provide the country.
102. 1 OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 15, BP 2.11 Annex A, 7 (Content of a Country
Assistance Strategy Document).
103. The Bank has adopted this approach in a limited number of projects. Its Latin America
and Caribbean region has implemented a participatory monitoring and evaluation system for
several pilot "community-driven development projects" affecting indigenous peoples, particularly
in Brazil. These projects aim to give more control over decisions and resources to community
groups. However, other regions have yet to fully operationalize this approach in all of their
projects.
104. The Inter-American Development Bank is currently preparing a policy on indigenous
peoples that will likely borrow from that of the World Bank. In addition, many multinational
corporations have recently developed codes of conduct that address the protection of indigenous
peoples. For example, since 1998 WMC Resources Ltd. has required prospective contractors to
declare an intention to develop a local community or indigenous peoples plan. The company's
"indigenous policy" highlights its commitment to respecting human rights, cultural diversity, and
heritage. See WMC Res. Ltd., Sustainability, http://www.wmc.com/sustainability (last visited Apr.
28, 2005).
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institutions cooperate and harmonize their policies on indigenous peoples,
countries will be pressured to comply with indigenous rights norms because
they will have no alternative funding source.
CONCLUSION
Many critiques of the World Bank incorrectly assume that the Bank is
an institution with uniform interests and a single voice, represented by
official policies and documents. In analyses of the Bank's implementation
of its safeguard policies, NGOs rarely recognize the multiplicity of
perspectives within the institution. Some advocates, for example, may have
analyzed the aforementioned decision to grant a loan to Morocco as an
indication that the Bank is not committed to indigenous rights. This view
would only present a partial picture of what is actually going on inside the
organization.
I have demonstrated in this Note that there are alternative opinions
within the Bank, such as those of environmentalists and anthropologists,
who may be deeply committed to the protection of indigenous rights but
who must struggle for influence over Bank decisionmaking.
Misrepresentations of the Bank by indigenous rights advocates threaten to
derail potential cooperation between the Bank and NGOs to achieve norm
internalization in countries. In the long term, advocates may alienate their
allies at the institution and hinder the interests of those they represent.
When advocates recognize internal power struggles, they can cooperate
with sympathetic employees to promote their cause.
Given conflicts within the organizational culture of the Bank,
ethnographic fieldwork is necessary to illuminate internal decisionmaking
regarding the institution's approach to human rights. By interviewing Bank
staff, tracking the loan approval cycle, and observing consultation meetings
with civil society organizations, one could uncover the Bank's hidden
internal operations. This fieldwork would promote meaningful interactions
and partnerships between the institution, advocates, and indigenous peoples
who are historically underrepresented in development decisions affecting
them. It would also offer lessons for how other international economic
organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, can incorporate
human rights norms in their operations.
Such a study would contribute to a growing body of literature on the
anthropology of institutions, including the nature and shape of bureaucratic
power, the conditions that propel changes in organizational ideologies, and
the production and circulation of rights-based normative discourses within
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organizational cultures.' 0 5 Because international law is complicated by soft
enforcement mechanisms and transnational relations of power, it is
particularly important to study international institutions ethnographically
and disaggregate the multiple actors working within them. Recognition of
internal contestations would shed further light on contradictions inherent in
human rights culture and illuminate how transformation occurs from within
institutions. The World Bank's approach to indigenous rights is but one
case study of this broader theme. Understanding how the line between
economic and political issues is drawn both inside and outside the Bank
reveals how seemingly depoliticized power is exerted by an institution that
is itself the product of competing internal interests.
105. See, e.g., JAMES FERGUSON, THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: "DEVELOPMENT,"
DEPOLITICIZATION, AND BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO (1994); HUGH GUSTERSON,
NUCLEAR RITES: A WEAPONS LABORATORY AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR (1996); MICHAEL
HERZFELD, THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF INDIFFERENCE: EXPLORING THE SYMBOLIC ROOTS OF
WESTERN BUREAUCRACY (1992).
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